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SUPERPRIORITY STATUS: THE SOLUTION
TO THE COLLECTION OF CERCLA
RESPONSE COSTS
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA)l authorizes the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to demand reimbursement from po-
tentially responsible parties (PRPs) for the costs of hazardous
waste cleanup. 2 Corporations often file bankruptcy to avoid
CERCLA liability, which forces the EPA to fund the entire,
exorbitant cost of cleanup.3 The EPA recently has begun ac-
quiring an equity stake in corporations as reimbursement for its
CERCLA cleanup costs to avoid such results. 4 Such an ap-
proach, however, does not resolve the conflict between CERCLA
and the Bankruptcy Code (Code).
This Note proposes to allow the EPA to collect response costs
from corporations both inside and outside of bankruptcy. Part
I outlines the CERCLA cleanup procedure. Part II discusses the
EPA's equity stake approach to reimbursement of response costs
and demonstrates why such an approach does not effectively
solve the policy conflict between CERCLA and the Code. Part
III analyzes the issues of whether environmental obligations
constitute claims in bankruptcy, the priority of such claims, and
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2. CERCLA requires that a site be included on the National Priority List
(NPL) before funds from the Superfund may be used for its cleanup. 40
C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (1993). However, a site need not be listed on the NPL
in order for the EPA to respond under 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992) or to compel a private party to respond under 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988).
40 C.F.R. § 300.400 (1993).
For a complete discussion of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, see Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made
Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 Bus. LAw. 923 (1990).
3. See infra notes 17, 37-93, and accompanying text for discussions of
the costs of hazardous waste cleanup and bankruptcy measures taken to avoid
CERCLA liabilities, respectively.
4. See infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
equity stake approach.
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the effect of the automatic stay on CERCLA claims. Part IV
proposes a new federal statute that gives the EPA "superprior-
ity" status in bankruptcy over all other secured and unsecured
creditors and reconciles the conflict between the policies of
environmental and bankruptcy laws.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL RECLAMATION UNDER CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 and revised it in 1986
with the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA). 5 With the passage of these Acts, Congress intended to
effectuate the following objectives: to encourage maximum care
and responsibility in the handling of hazardous waste; to provide
rapid response to environmental emergencies; to encourage vol-
untary cleanup of hazardous waste spills; to encourage early
reporting of violations of the statute; and to ensure that parties
responsible for the release of hazardous substances bear the
costs of response and damage to natural resources.6
Section 104 of CERCLA authorizes the EPA to take the
response measures necessary to protect the public health and
welfare and the environment. 7 Section 106 authorizes the EPA,
5. CERCLA refers to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended by the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992). In this Note, both CERCLA and the amendments enacted
by SARA will be referred to collectively as "CERCLA."
6. Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F.
Supp. 1285, 1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 19875.
CERCLA imposes liability on four types of persons. These are:
1) the owner or operator of a vessel or facility;
2) the owner or operator of a facility at the time of disposal of
any hazardous substance;
3) any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise "arranged
for disposal" ("generators"); and
4) any person who transported hazardous substances ("transport-
ers").
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
Federal courts have also generally interpreted CERCLA to permit joint and
several liability regardless of fault when harm and the extent of harm are
indivisible. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844-45 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
7. Section 104(a)(1) of CERCLA provides in part:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a
substantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B)
there is a release or substantial threat of release into the environ-
ment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare,
the President is authorized to act, consistent with the national
contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and
provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
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in cases of "imminent and substantial endangerment," to order
a PRP or a group of PRPs to conduct and pay for cleanup.'
The EPA may also impose substantial penalties for noncompli-
ance in conjunction with such orders. 9
Alternatively, Congress provided that the EPA may undertake
its own hazardous substance cleanup actions pursuant to section
104.10 The EPA then may seek reimbursement of Superfund"
money pursuant to section 107, as well as treble damages from
PRPs . 2 A PRP may also agree to conduct the cleanup and the
pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its removal from
any contaminated natural resource), or take any other response
measure consistent with the national contingency plan which the
President deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare
or the environment. When the President determines that such
action will be done properly and promptly by the owner or
operator of the facility or vessel or by any other responsible party,
the President may allow such person to carry out the action....
CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988).
8. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). Section 106 orders
have not been used widely because PRPs often negotiate consent decrees.
Barr, supra note 2, at 935.
9. PRPs that fail to comply with § 106 orders may be subject to
noncompliance penalties of $25,000 per day and an enforcement action by the
United States Department of Justice (DOJ). CERCLA § 106(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(b)(1) (1988).
10. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
objectives Congress set out.
11. Section 111 of CERCLA created the Superfund, which is a federal
trust fund to which Congress initially allocated $1.6 billion. In 1986, Congress
amended CERCLA to provide $8.5 billion for use over a 5-year period.
CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988). The money allocated to the fund
comes from taxes collected on petroleum products and certain inorganic
chemicals. 26 U.S.C. § 9507(b) (1988). The Superfund may be used to pay
nongovernmental claims only when PRPs cannot pay for the response costs
or cannot be identified. CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2) (1988). Barr,
supra note 2, at 953.
12. CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1988). See also United
States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988) (holding company owner
and operator of site jointly and severally liable for response costs); United
States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987)
(holding parties jointly and severally liable for response costs not inconsistent
with the National Contingency Plan). Federal district courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction over actions under CERCLA § 107. CERCLA § 113, 42
U.S.C. § 9613(b) (1988). See T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680
F. Supp. 696, 700-703 (D.N.J. 1988) (denying defendant's contention that
New Jersey's "entire controversy doctrine" precluded plaintiff from maintain-
ing action in federal court because plaintiff's claim could not have been
brought in previous state court action). Furthermore, pursuant to the 1986
SARA amendments, CERCLA § 113(e) provides for nationwide service of
process "[in any action by the United States under" CERCLA. CERCLA §
113(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(e) (1988). CERCLA and SARA do not authorize
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Superfund will reimburse the PRP for a portion of the response
costs, 3 or use a combination of the funding mechanisms to
conduct and pay for portions of the cleanup (mixed funding).' 4
Congress intended that those responsible for releases of hazard-
ous substances, not the taxpayers, shall be liable for the financial
burdens of cleanup. 5 The EPA, however, has found it exceed-
ingly difficult to collect reimbursement for response costs from
corporations and other PRPs.
nationwide service of process by states and private plaintiffs. See Violet v.
Picillo, 613 F. Supp. 1563, 1569-73 (D.R.I. 1985) (relying on Rule 4(f) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to find that the court lacks jurisdiction unless
a federal statute or separate rule permits such nationwide service of process);
Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 28 (E.D. Mo. 1985)(finding that court lacked personal jurisdiction over corporation because this
lawsuit was brought under CERCLA, which does not authorize nationwide
service of process for private plaintiffs).
The EPA may mail out "special notice letters" to PRPs containing a formal
demand for reimbursement of past and future costs incurred at a site, trigger
a 120-day period for formal settlement negotiations with EPA, and provide
site-specific information to assist in negotiations, including a Statement of
Work for the response actions to be taken at a site and a proposed Consent
Decree. See CERCLA § 122(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e). See also 56 Fed. Reg.
30,996-31,012 (1991) (introducing EPA's Model Consent Decree).
13. See CERCLA § 122(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(1) (1988); Ohio v.
Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Kovacs.
Hanson and Krakaur compiled examples of various courts' interpretations
of response costs:
Courts have interpreted "response costs" to include not only the
costs directed at the cleanup of contamination, such as investiga-
tions, monitoring, testing, and evaluation and implementation of
a response action, City of New York v. Exxon, 633 F. Supp. 609,
618 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), but also to include related costs, such as
enforcement and oversight costs of the EPA and Department of
Justice, see U.S. v. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 850; administra-
tive costs of agencies, see U.S. v. South Carolina Recycling &
Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 1008 (D.S.C. 1984); attorney's
fees, see General Electric v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc.,
920 F.2d 1415, 1421-22 (8th Cir. 1990); cf. Pease & Curren
Refining, Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 951 (C.D.
Cal. 1990) (only U.S. may recover attorney's fees); relocation of
business costs, see Lutz v. Cromatex, 718 F. Supp. 413, 419-20(M.D. Pa. 1989); and site security, see Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden,
Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989).
John N. Hanson & Peter Krakaur, Allocation: The Engine that Drives or
Derails Superfund Settlement, 484-85 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Course Series No. 425, 1991).
14. CERCLA § 122(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(1) (1988). See 53 Fed. Reg.
8279 (1988) (discussing mixed funding settlement guidance).
15. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
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A. Problems Inherent in Reimbursement Procedures
Reimbursement procedures create several problems when ap-
plied to large corporations. First, there may be as many as 4000
PRPs involved in one Superfund site.1 6 Second, the average cost
of hazardous waste cleanup is thirty million dollars. 7 Third,
many corporations seek refuge in bankruptcy to avoid exorbitant
cleanup costs. 8
B. Bankruptcy as a Means of A voiding Environmental
Liability
The Bankruptcy Code does not require a debtor to be insolvent
before it files for bankruptcy. 9 Consequently, bankruptcy has
become a haven for corporations with substantial environmental
liabilities under CERCLA. 20 In 1988, almost ten percent of all
environmental cases pending at the Department of Justice in-
16. Nancy Firestone, Government Perspectives on Bankruptcy and Envi-
ronmental Law Interaction, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,358, 10,359
(1988). See also Lori Jonas, Note, Dividing the Toxic Pie: Why Superfund
Contingent Contribution Claims Should Not Be Barred by the Bankruptcy
Code, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 850, 852 n.25 (1991) (noting that the government
retains discretion to hold a number of polluters liable for cleanup costs).
17. Kevin J. Saville, Discharging CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: When
Does a Claim Arise?, 76 MINN. L. REv. 327 n.5. (1991). See also A REPORT
To THE HOUSE Comm. ON APPROPRIATIONS, ON THE STATUS OF THE ENVTL.
PROTEcTiON AGENCY'S SU'ERFuND PROGRAM, in PRAcTiCA APPROACHES To
REDUCE ENvTL. CLEANUP COSTS 1988, at 405, 424 (PLI Real Estate Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 317, 1988); William H. Rodgers, Jr.,
A Superfund Trivia Test: A Comment on the Complexity of the Environmental
Laws, 22 ENVTL. L. 417, 426, 432 (1992) (stating that the average cost of
cleaning up a Superfund site is $24 million) (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, SUPERFUND STRATEGY: SUMMARY 21-26 (1985)).
A third source stated that in October 1986, when Congress amended the
Superfund law, the average cost of a single Superfund cleanup cost ranged
between $30 and $40 million. Thomas J. Salerno et al., Environmental Law
and Its Impact on Bankruptcy Law - Saga of "Toxins-R' Us," 25 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 261, 263 (1990).
18. Jonas, supra note 16, at 863 n.91. See also infra notes 20-22 and
accompanying text for a description of the number of PRPs that file or will
file for bankruptcy.
19. DOUGLAS G. BAiRD, THE ELEMENTS or BANKRUPTCY 37 (rev. ed. 1993);
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS
AND CREDrrORS: TEXTS, CASES, AND PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1991).
20. "The existence or threat of environmental liability has been invoked
successfully as a basis for seeking relief under the federal bankruptcy laws."
Kevin T. Haroff, Environmental Liabilities Under Federal Bankruptcy Laws
1 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 717, The Impact
of Environmental Regulations on Business Transactions 1990). See, e.g., United
States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1177 (D.N.H.
1982) (finding that district court lacked jurisdiction to order use of company
funds for cleanup until bankruptcy resolved).
Washington University Open Scholarship
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volved bankruptcy issues. 21 The EPA predicts that twenty-five
to thirty percent of refuse facilities will file for bankruptcy
during the next fifty years.2 With almost one out of three
corporations escaping liability through bankruptcy, average
cleanup costs approaching $30 million, and almost 1200 priority
sites on the National Priority List as of 1989,23 the EPA must
establish a new procedure to obtain reimbursement for CERCLA
response costs.
II. EPA's RECENT APPROACH: CORPORATIONS MAY
REIMBURSE EPA WITH STOCK
To reimburse the Superfund for response costs, the EPA has
begun taking an equity stake in several corporations liable for
environmental cleanup. 24 In re U.E. Systems, Inc.25 is one case
in which such an approach was attempted. 26 The United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Indiana approved
a settlement as part of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization
21. Firestone, supra note 16, at 10,358.
22. Jill T. Losch, Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligations: Clash of the
Titans, 52 LA. L. REv. 137, 138 n.1 (citing U.S. General Accounting Office,
Hazardous Waste, Environmental Safeguards Jeopardized When Facilities
Cease Operating 18 (1986)).
23. Barr, supra note 2, at 935. See also 11 ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
A MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM (1989) (identifying
nearly 30,000 sites tainted with hazardous waste).
According to current estimates, it will cost approximately $30 billion to
clean up the 1250 NPL sites. Rodgers, supra note 17, at 421. Lost recovery
actions initiated by the United States recovered only 9% of the $2.6 billion
spent on Superfund. Id. at 430.
24. See Consent Decree Covers 20 Sites, STPERFUND WEEK, Sept. 4, 1992;
Environmental Claims, 61 U.S.L.W. 2266, 2267 (Nov. 3, 1992); EPA Gets
Claim in Bankruptcy Company's Reorganization, PESTICIDE & ToXIC CHEMICAL
NEws, Oct. 7, 1992; EPA Gets Equity Stake in Firm; Company Relieved of
Liability, HAzmRous WASTE NEWS, Oct. 13, 1992; EPA Makes "Unusual"
Settlement With Uniroyal, GREENWVITE, Oct. 2, 1992, at Marketplace; Elisabeth
Kirschner, EPA Gets Uniroyal Technology Stock, CHEMICAL WEEK, Oct. 14,
1992, at 12; Jonathan M. Moses, EPA Gets Stake in Firm to Settle Cleanup
Claims, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1992, at B1.
25. United States v. U.E. Sys., Inc. (In re U.E. Sys., Inc.), No. 01-32791-
HCD (N.D. Ind. filed Sept. 28, 1992). This case is still pending in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Indiana. However, the
court ordered that the Settlement Agreement motion be granted on September
28, 1992.
26. The use of the word "attempted" was intentional because at the time
of this Note, a Settlement Agreement had been approved by the Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Indiana, but the EPA had yet to receive
the stock. See Lodging of Consent Decree, 57 Fed. Reg. 37,839 (1992), for
the proposed Settlement Agreement that was accepted by the Bankruptcy
Court in the Order granted on September 28, 1992.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
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plan whereby the EPA, the Department of the Interior, and
Indiana and Wisconsin state environmental agencies took a
major stake in the Uniroyal Technology Corporation in order
to free the company of liabilities at twenty environmental cleanup
sites around the United States.27 Caroline DiBonita, attorney for
the EPA, claims that the arrangement was "precedent setting
because of its size. ' '2
A. Why The EPA Should Not Accept Stock In Corporations
The government, specifically the EPA and the Department of
the Interior, should be prevented from taking equity stakes in
corporations. First, the government theoretically remains unin-
volved in private business. There is no compelling reason for
governmental agencies to deviate from that norm in this context
by acquiring substantial equity stakes in large corporations.
Second, there is potential for abuse when the government
involves itself in management. 29 A conflict of interest arises
when the EPA serves as both shareholder and regulator. The
EPA becomes involved in decision-making from the inside of
the corporation as a significant shareholder, and from the
outside as a regulatory agency. The EPA cannot hold these two
positions simultaneously without losing its objectivity. A share-
holder's objective is to increase the financial success of the
corporation while encouraging economic growth. Conversely,
the EPA's regulatory objective is to protect the public's health
and welfare as well as the environment.
Third, the EPA currently does not have a structure established
to manage these shares of stock. To continue the practice of
taking equity stakes, the EPA would have to create a separate
division of the Enforcement Section to be responsible for its
investment stock. This section would decide whether to hold the
stock, and accordingly, when to sell the shares. Currently, if
the EPA decides to retain the stock as an investment, Superfund
is not reimbursed immediately, and may never be if the corpo-
ration is unsuccessful after reorganization. If the EPA decides
to sell the shares immediately, it acts inappropriately because
the EPA is not in the business of selling corporate stock.3 0
27. In re U.E. Sys., Inc., No. 01-32791-HCD. The EPA received a 1207o
equity stake in Uniroyal Technology Corp., while the Department of the
Interior and the states of Wisconsin and Indiana each received 1.9 million
shares of stock. Moses, supra note 24, at BI.
28. Moses, supra note 24, at BI.
29. Id. at B7. (citing Chris Buckley, an environmental lawyer in the
Washington D.C. office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher).
30. Moses, supra note 24, at B7.
19941
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Finally, the EPA is only willing to take stock as a last resort
from corporations that are insolvent or in bankruptcy. Solvent
corporations, on the other hand, are capable of reimbursing the
Superfund, or quickly and efficiently conducting the cleanup
themselves, which are the ideal results under CERCLA.31 Con-
sequently, the stock that the EPA receives under this approach
is generally worthless. Even if a bankrupt corporation survives
Chapter 11,32 it will be several years before its stock has any
significant value. To avoid the EPA's use of the equity stake
and similar approaches, Congress should give the EPA a super-
priority status over secured and unsecured creditors. Such a
statute would allow the EPA to exert all of its energy on
environmental cleanup rather than negotiating with corporations
for reimbursement of response costs.
III. BANKRUPTCY CLAMS AND PRIolUTY
The reimbursement of response costs by corporations that file
bankruptcy is difficult due to the inherent conflict between
CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code. CERCLA focuses on speed
and efficiency in the cleanup of environmental sites. Conse-
quently, the government does not instigate litigation until after
the cleanup has begun.3 3 Conversely, the Code accelerates claims
and litigation to allow the debtor to begin its "fresh start" as
soon as possible.34 These conflicting policies concerning the
31. See generally Barr, supra note 2, for a discussion of the ability of
solvent corporations to reimburse the Superfund.
32. Many corporations that file Chapter 11 bankruptcy fail before they
ever create and submit a plan of reorganization to the Creditors' Committee
and other creditors. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 19, at 432. Because
a debtor has the absolute right to convert a Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7
case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (a) (1988), many projected liquidations are
filed in Chapter 11. WuN & WESTBROOK, supra note 19, at 433. Conse-
quently, it is impossible to get accurate data concerning the number of genuine
Chapter 11 reorganizations that succeed. Id. Creditors and the trustee may
also convert a Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
1112(b), if it is in the best interests of the estate and there is cause. Id.
Conversion is required if a majority of the creditors do not approve the plan
of reorganization as specified in 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988).
33. Robin E. Phelan et al., Dancing the Toxic Two-Step: Environmental
Problems in Bankruptcy Cases, 445,616 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 601, Advanced Bankruptcy Workshop 1992).
34. Id. Ironically, one commentator proposed that the "fresh start" policy
does not apply to corporate debtors because the 1978 Act does not contain a
provision for the discharge of the debts of "non-individuals." See Douglas
C. Ballentine, Note, Recovering Costs for Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste
Sites: An Examination of State Superlien Statutes, 63 IND. L.I 571, 572 n.9
(1988). See also 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1988).
Such an approach seems to conflict with the notion of the Chapter 11https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
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timing of claims and litigation become complex and confusing. 35
In fact, the timing of environmental issues delays a bankruptcy
court's determination of the validity, amount, and priority of a
claim.36
Further, neither the Code nor CERCLA make any provision
for the priority of environmental obligations in bankruptcy.
Therefore, courts have been left to decide whether environmental
obligations constitute claims in bankruptcy, and if so, whether
these claims have priority over other claims in bankruptcy.
A. Environmental Claims In Bankruptcy
Because it is not expressly indicated in the Bankruptcy Code,
there has been much debate over whether CERCLA's environ-
mental obligations constitute claims in bankruptcy. The Code
defines "claim" as "a right to payment" or "a right to an
equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives
rise to a right to payment. ' 37 Congress intended to define
"claim" broadly, as indicated in the legislative history, which
includes all of the debtor's legal obligations in the definition of
''claim.' 38
reorganization in which corporations are discharged from liabilities and emerge
from bankruptcy with a clean slate. However, some claims are not discharge-
able in bankruptcy.
See infra notes 37-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
dischargeability of bankruptcy claims. See generally 3A COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPrcY (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1979) (providing an in-depth discussion
of the Bankruptcy Code).
35. Phelan, supra note 33, at 616.
36. Id. Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code concerns the allowance of
claims in bankruptcy cases. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1988). Section 502(a) deems
claims "allowable" unless a party-in-interest objects. Id. at § 502(a). See infra
notes 39-55 for a discussion of different approaches to the timing issue.
37. Under the Bankruptcy Code, "claim" is defined as:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, con-
tingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
unsecured...
11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A), (B) (Supp. IV 1992).
38. "[T]he [Code] contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no
matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the
bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy
court." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807-08.
29919941
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Courts have been inconsistent in deciding whether environ-
mental obligations constitute claims in bankruptcy. In In re
Chateaugay Corp. 39 the Second Circuit held that CERCLA
response costs incurred by the EPA are pre-petition claims,
which are potentially dischargeable in bankruptcy, even if such
costs actually are incurred after the petition is filed.40 The court
required, however, that the response costs result from a release
or threatened release of hazardous waste that occurs before the
debtor files its petition. 4' The Second Circuit focused on the
effect of the injunction rather than the timing of the release.
According to the court, an order containing an injunction that
"ends or ameliorates continued pollution" is not a dischargeable
claim.42 The court reasoned that the EPA may not accept
monetary payment in lieu of preventing future pollution. 43
The court found that a dischargeable claim does arise, how-
ever, when an order requires the PRP to clean up a site. The
injunction to clean up a site is in effect a monetary obligation
because the EPA has the option to perform the cleanup itself
and sue for reimbursement. 4 Finally, orders which combine an
order to clean up a site with an order to "end[] or ameliorate[]
39. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). In Chateaugay, the LTV Corporation
filed a bankruptcy petitidn under Chapter 11 listing 24 pages of "contingent"
claims held by the federal EPA and all 50 state EPA branches in its schedule
of liabilities. Id. at 999. LTV is a diversified steel, aerospace, and energy
corporation. Id. The suit concerned two issues: (1) whether CERCLA response
costs incurred by the EPA are pre-petition claims dischargeable in bankruptcy;
and (2) whether response costs incurred during the bankruptcy at sites owned
or operated by the debtor constitute administrative expenses entitled to priority
under the Code. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text for a discussion
of administrative expense priority.
40. 944 F.2d at 1006. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
Comment, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1119,
1204 (1984) [hereinafter Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy].
41. The EPA (referred to as Government in this case) argued that it did
not have a claim for reimbursement of CERCLA response costs until those
costs were incurred. 944 F.2d at 1000. The EPA argued that a narrow reading
of claim would better serve CERCLA's objectives because response costs
resulting from pre-petition release or threatened release of hazardous substances
would not be considered claims. Id. at 1002. Thus, the EPA could later assert
its right to reimbursement against the reorganized debtor to receive the full
value of its claim. Id. However, the court noted that such a narrow reading
of claim may deny the EPA its right to reimbursement when the debtor
converts its Chapter 11 reorganization into a Chapter 7 liquidation. When
such a conversion occurs, the EPA cannot collect because its claim has not
yet matured. Id. at 1005, 1008.
42. Id. at 1008.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1009. CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
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continued pollution" are not dischargeable claims.45 The court
recognized that "most environmental injunctions will fall on the
non-'claim' side of the line." Such a finding follows previous
Supreme Court decisions including Ohio v. Kovacs,47 which held
that if the environmental obligation could be satisfied only by
the payment of money, the obligation was a claim.
The Ninth Circuit advocated a different approach for deter-
mining whether an environmental obligation constitutes a claim.
In In re Dant & Russell,4 the court upheld the district court's
allowance of a claim for expenses already incurred in CERCLA
cleanup, but reversed the lower court's allowance of response
costs not yet incurred.49 The court reasoned that the PRPs
would no longer have an incentive to complete the cleanup if
they were awarded future costs before completing the work.50
The Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Texas
advocated a third approach in In re National Gypsum Co. 51 The
court held that CERCLA liabilities were dischargeable claims to
the extent that the parties could fairly contemplate liabilities at
the commencement of the case.5 2 The court based its holding
45. 944 F.2d at 1008. The Second Circuit refused to bifurcate the order
into that which is ordinarily considered a dischargeable claim and that which
is nondischargeable. Id. at 997. But cf. In re National Gypsum, 139 B.R. 397
(N.D. Tex. 1992) (bifurcating claim according to traditional notions of dis-
chargeability). For a discussion of In re National Gypsum, see infra notes 51-
55 and accompanying text.
46. 944 F.2d at 1008.
47. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
48. Dant & Russell, Inc. v. Burlington N.R.R. (In re Dant & Russell,
Inc.), 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991).
49. Id. at 250. The debtor dumped toxic wastes on the property that it
leased from Burlington Northern Railroad (BN) to operate a wood treatment
plant. The Railroad cleaned up the property and subsequently filed a claim
against the debtor in the debtor's bankruptcy case for both previous costs
incurred and future response costs in connection with the leased property. The
lower court allowed all costs to constitute a claim in bankruptcy. Id.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court as to the future claims based
upon the CERCLA provision requiring that costs must be incurred before
they may be recovered. Id. In this manner, the Ninth Circuit made its
determination of claims based upon its interpretation of the term "incurred."
Id.
Such a holding does not prevent BN from recovering these costs in the
future under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 5020) (1988), by means of a
motion for reconsideration. Additionally, BN may file subsequent suits against
the reorganized corporation for costs incurred post-petition. Furthermore, BN
could obtain a declaratory decree from the bankruptcy court that would
apportion liability for costs if and when incurred. 951 F.2d at 250.
50. Id. at 250. See generally Barr, supra note 2, for a discussion of the
reimbursement procedures associated with CERCLA response costs.
51. 139 B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
52. Id. at 409.
19941
Washington University Open Scholarship
302 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 46:291
on a "fair contemplation theory"53 rather than the "contingent
claim" theory articulated by the Chateaugay court. 4 The court
refuted this distinction because it was meaningless and held that
the only distinction that should be drawn is between whether
the parties fairly contemplated response costs.55
B. Estimating Amount of Claim
Debtors often argue that the EPA does not have a claim
because its claim is contingent at the time the debtor files its
petition in bankruptcy. 56 However, section 502(c) of the Code
53. The court insisted that "the only meaningful distinction ... is one
that distinguishes between costs associated with pre-petition conduct resulting
in a release or threat of release that could have been 'fairly' contemplated by
the parties; and those that could not have been 'fairly' contemplated by the
parties." Id. at 407-08 (footnotes omitted).
The district court in United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R.
831 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990), also relied on the fair contemplation of the
parties prior to bankruptcy. Id. at 834-37. The court refused to discharge
post-bankruptcy claims that resulted from pre-petition conduct because the
EPA was not aware that the debtor owned the property at the time of the
filing. Id.
54. In Chateaugay, the court refused to recognize a claim based solely
upon the debtor's pre-petition conduct. Instead, the court focused on the
debtor's pre-petition conduct resulting in release or threatened release of
hazardous substance. 944 F.2d at 1000, 1005. The Chateaugay court speculated
that it would not allow a dischargeable claim for response costs incurred as
a result of a debtor improperly sealing barrels containing hazardous waste.
Id. at 1002. Although the court may well have been aware that the debtor's
pre-petition conduct would result in future response costs, there was no pre-
petition release or threatened release at the time of filing. Thus, the resulting
response costs did not constitute a dischargeable claim.,
The National Gypsum court disagreed and noted that the Fifth Circuit held
that the disposal of the hazardous substance itself constitutes a "release' or
threat of release." 139 B.R. at 408 n.25 (citing Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden,
Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir. 1989)). In addition, CERCLA defines
"release" to include "... dumping, or disposing into the environment (in-
cluding the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed
receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contami-
nant... )." CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988). Therefore, the
Chateaugay court incorrectly hypothesized that response costs resulting from
a debtor's sealing of barrels containing hazardous waste does not constitute a
dischargeable claim.
55. 139 B.R. at 407-08 (footnotes omitted). The court enunciated five
factors to determine whether "fair contemplation" existed: 1) knowledge by
the parties of a site in which a PRP may be liable; 2) NPL listing; 3)
notification by EPA of PRP liability; 4) commencement of investigation and
cleanup activities; and 5) incurrence of response costs. Id. at 408 (footnote
omitted).
56. See, e.g., In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991)
(disallowing claim status for contingent claims resulting from costs not yet
incurred).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
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allows courts to estimate contingent or unliquidated claims. 57
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas re-
cently became the first court to apply "claim estimation" to
environmental claims in the National Gypsum bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. 5 One commentator objected to an estimate of all
liabilities associated with pre-petition activities based solely upon
a pre-petition release because it "represents a formidable if not
insurmountable task.'' 59
C. Priority of Environmental Claims
The Code provides the following priorities for bankruptcy
claims: secured claims, administrative expenses, priority claims
(such as tax claims held by governmental units), unsecured
claims, and equity interests.60 All claims held by a specific class,
such as secured creditors, must be satisfied before the next class
receives anything.6' If the assets fail to satisfy the claims of a
class, the creditors in that particular class share pro rata in the
57. Section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(c) There shall be estimated for purposes of allowance under this
section -
(1) any contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation
of which, as the case may be, would unduly delay the administra-
tion of the case; or
(2) any right to payment arising from a right to an equitable
remedy for breach of performance.
11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988).
58. James K. McBain, Note, Environmental Impediments to Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 68 IND. L.J. 233, 241 n.53 (1992) (citing Court in Texas
Produces First Estimation of U.S. CERCLA Costs, Resource Damages, Bankr.
L. Daily (BNA) (July 9, 1992) (discussing In re National Gypsum (In re
National Gypsum 1I), No. 390-37213-SAF- 1I (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 24,
1992)).
59. Saville, supra note 17, at 352. Estimation puts a tremendous burden
upon the courts:
The problem of contingent claims in bankruptcy is ... the ques-
tion whether or not the bankruptcy court will deem liquidation or
estimation of the claim reasonably feasible, a question ... whose
solution will ultimately rest upon the exercise of judicial discretion
in light of the circumstances of the case, particularly the probable
duration of the process of liquidation as compared with the period
of future uncertainty due to the contingency in question.
Id. at 352 n.199 (citing 3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY para. 63.30 at 1912
(James W. Moore ed., 14th ed. 1975)).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). McBain, supra note 58, at
242 (citing Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
131 B.R. 561, 565 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (viewing "priority claim" as a
reference to claims under CERCLA § 507(a)(2)-(8))). Administrative expenses
may also be considered a type of priority claim instead of their own category.
Id. at 242 n.57.
61. WARREN & W BSTBROOK, supra note 19, at 225-26.
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remaining available assets. 62 Courts typically treat environmental
obligations as administrative expenses or unsecured claims.63
Administrative expenses are the "actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate ... ,64 and holders of such
claims are paid immediately after the secured creditors. 65 All
administrative expenses must be paid in full before the reorgan-
ization plan is approved. 6
Several courts, to the delight of the EPA, have found that
section 107 CERCLA response costs are administrative expenses
of the estate. 67 Such a finding requires the debtor to pay the
EPA these response costs in cash -before the plan may be
confirmed. Because such costs are exorbitant, most debtors will
not be able to pay, and Chapter 11 reorganization will fail. 68
62. For example, if the secured creditors' claims are satisfied and the
creditors with priority claims are owed $400,000 in the aggregate, but the
debtor has only $100,000 in assets remaining, the priority claim creditors will
each receive $0.25 on the dollar and the remaining creditors will receive
nothing.
63. Section 106(a) orders are almost uniformly accepted as administrative
expenses because they involve pre-petition government actions attempted "to
abate ... an 'imminent and identifiable threat."' In re National Gypsum II,
supra note 58.
The distinction often rests upon whether the obligation is a § 106 or a §
107 response cost. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (1988).
67. The principal case allowing administrative expense treatment for § 107
response costs is In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 831 F.2d 118 (6th
Cir. 1987). The court allowed a finding of administrative expense to deny
businesses in bankruptcy an advantage over businesses suffering from the
same type of liability outside of bankruptcy. Id. at 124. The court relied on
the test for determining priority status articulated in Reading Co. v. Brown,
391 U.S. 471 (1968). In re Wall Tube, 831 F.2d at 123. The Reading court
refused to allow relief to debtors in bankruptcy, even when the debtor was
not responsible for the release of hazardous waste, while imposing such liability
on similar parties outside of bankruptcy. Id. (quoting Reading, 391 U.S. at
482-83). As a result of the Reading approach, the general unsecured creditors
pay for the cleanup costs and the EPA has a higher priority status than other
government entities. McBain, supra note 58, at 243.
Other courts also have allowed the EPA an administrative expense priority
status. See In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987); In re T.P. Long Chem.,
45 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
Some courts allow administrative expense priority only upon a finding of
"imminent and identifiable harm" to the public health and safety. Midlantic
Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 507 n.9
(1986); see also In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 413 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1992) (permitting priority for pre-petition costs if "necessitated by con-
ditions that posed an imminent and identifiable harm to the environment and
public health").
68. McBain, supra note 58, at 242. See supra note 32 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the likelihood of a successful Chapter 11 reorganization.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
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Some courts, however, have found that environmental obli-
gations are unsecured claims.6 9 This classification encourages
reorganization because debtors are only required to pay a small
percentage of their outstanding liability to the EPA to discharge
cleanup claims. However, this classification also encourages
debtors to enter bankruptcy as a means of discharging environ-
mental liabilities because there will be few assets remaining for
the EPA to collect as an unsecured creditor. 70
D. Automatic Stay
Another provision of the Code, the automatic stay, also
conflicts with CERCLA. The automatic stay, section 362, is one
of the fundamental protections the Bankruptcy Code provides
69. Burlington N.R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell,
Inc.), 853 F.2d 700, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Dant & Russell 1]
(holding that absent explicit legislative direction, claims for cleanup costs
arising pre-petition should not receive administrative expense priority); Walsh
v. West Virginia (In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc.), 70 B.R. 786, 795 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 1987) (same). But see In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (granting EPA's response costs administrative
expense priority).
70. The minority view denies administrative priority and holds that cleanup
obligations are based upon pre-petition conduct, are compensatory in nature,
and do not benefit the estate. See, e.g., Dant & Russell 1, 853 F.2d 700, 706-
07 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying administrative expense priority for cleanup costs);
Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 141-42 (3d Cir. 1985)
(denying administrative priority to railroad's contractual indemnification claim
against debtor-in-possession for cost of cleaning up hazardous waste disposed
of by debtor on railroad's right of way).
The majority approach grants administrative expense priority based upon
the rationale that the costs expended in achieving compliance and ultimately
in assuring the public health are a necessary cost of preserving the estate. See,
e.g., Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prod. Co.), 831 F.2d
118, 123-24 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that response costs are actual and necessary
administrative expenses to preserve the estate and protect the public health);
In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987)
(granting EPA administrative priority for response costs over trustee's alle-
gations of EPA's bad faith); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 782-84 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1987) (holding that administration costs included those incurred in pro-
tecting the public from hazardous waste); In re Pierce Coal & Constr., Inc.,
65 B.R. 521, 531 (N.D. W. Va. 1986) (holding that reclamation costs have
administrative priority pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)); In re T.P. Long
Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 286 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (holding that EPA's costs
of responding to a release of hazardous substance were administrative expenses
because the "estate cannot avoid the liability imposed by CERCLA [so] it
follows that the cost incurred ... in discharging this liability is an actual
necessary cost of preserving the estate entitled to administrative expense
priority").
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to debtors. Section 362(a)(1) 71 stays any judicial, administrative,
or other actions or proceedings against the debtor, including the
enforcement of any judgment obtained before the petition. 72 The
automatic stay grants immediate, although temporary, relief to
the debtor and allows an orderly distribution of the debtor's
assets.7
Section 362, the automatic stay provision, contains two ex-
ceptions applicable to governmental authorities such as the EPA.
First, the "police power exception" exempts commencement of
actions within the police power of a governmental unit 74 from
the automatic stay.75 This exception allows the government to
71. Section 362 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition
filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application
filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable
to all entities, of -
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance
or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other
action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have
been commenced before the commencement of the case under this
title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before
the commencement of the case under this title....
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988).
72. An automatic stay provides relief to debtors from creditors constantly
harassing them to pay pre-petition debts. DAVID G. EPS'rEIN ET AL., BANK-
RUPTCY 59 (1993). Automatic stays apply only during the pendency of the
case. Id. at 62. Once the case is completed and the dischargeable debts are
discharged, the automatic stay no longer applies. Id. It is important to note,
however, that some debts are not dischargeable and therefore the debtor
remains liable for such debts after bankruptcy. See supra notes 37-55 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the dischargeability of claims in bank-
ruptcy.
73. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 19, at 212.
74. Section 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "governmental unit"
to include federal, state, and municipal governments and their instrumentalities.
11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (Supp. IV 1992).
75. Section 362(b)(4) provides:
The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this
title, or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), does not
operate as a stay -
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement
or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit
to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power.
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1988).
The legislative history of § 362 indicates that Congress intended environ-
mental laws to be considered police and regulatory powers. See H.R. REp.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
6299 ("[W]here a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop
violation of ... environmental protection ... safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the
action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay.").https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
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obtain an injunction to protect public health and safety, and
has also been applied to the prevention of environmental law
violations.7 6 However, the legislative history prohibits applying
the police power exception to actions protecting monetary in-
terest in the debtor's property or estate. 7 The distinction between
monetary interests and public health and safety objectives often
prevents governmental units from obtaining priority over other
creditors. 78 Courts have held that the exception applies to non-
monetary judgments but does not allow for recovery of monetary
awards.7 9
The second exception to the automatic stay is found in section
362(b)(5), which exempts non-monetary judgments80 obtained to
enforce a governmental unit's police or regulatory power. 81
76. See, e.g., Walsh v. West Virginia (In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc.), 70
B.R. 786, 795 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that order to cease activities
violating state law fell within § 362(b)(4)).
77. 124 CONG. RIc. S17,409 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); 124 CONG. REc.
Hll,092 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
78. McBain, supra note 58, at 245. See also Jonas, supra note 16, at 865-
66.
79. Phelan, supra note 33, at 635. One unsettled issue is whether govern-
mental injunctions and cleanup orders relating to third persons are exempt
from the statute because they are deemed equal to monetary judgments. Id.
See United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982) (requiring a
landfill owner to perform a study of toxic hazards at his site in part because
such relief was preventive, not compensatory, even though it required monetary
payments). See also Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733
F.2d 267, 274-78 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a state's injunction is exempt
from the automatic stay and requiring a Chapter 7 debtor to take cleanup
actions, even though these actions required a substantial expenditure that
would deplete the estate's assets). The court in Penn Terra indicated that the
automatic stay would apply to actions to clean up past harm but not to orders
to prevent future harm. Id. at 278. Penn Terra leaves to the bankruptcy court
the authority to issue a discretionary stay under § 105 if "necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]." Id. at
273.
80. See Laurel E. Lockett, Environmental Liability Enforcement and the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978: A Study of H.R. 2767, The "Superlien" Provision,
19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 859, 870-71 (1984). A "money judgment" has
been defined as "one which adjudges the payment of a sum of money, as
distinguished from one directing an act to be done or property to be transferred
or restored." United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Fort Misery Highway
Dist., 22 F.2d 369, 372 (9th Cir. 1927) (citation omitted). In Ohio v. Kovacs,
469 U.S. 274 (1985), the Supreme Court held that an individual debtor's
obligation to clean up a hazardous waste site amounted to a money judgment
and was dischargeable under the Code. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Ohio v. Kovacs.
81. Section 362(b)(5) provides:
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this
title, or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), does not
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Courts differ over whether this exception permits enforcement
of cleanup orders, or whether enforcement would be barred as
an attempt to enforce a monetary judgment against the debtor,
which the automatic stay provision prohibits. 2
The Third Circuit dealt with both of these exceptions in Penn
Terra v. Department of Environmental Resources.3 The court
interpreted the police power exception broadly, while it narrowly
construed the "enforcement of a monetary judgment." ' 4 Com-
mentators fear that a broad interpretation of the police power
exception would cause reorganizations to fail because the envi-
ronmental liabilities will have priority status over all other
unsecured claims, leaving few assets available for use in the
debtor's reorganization.85
operate as a stay -
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement
of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an
action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such
governmental unit's police or regulatory power."
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1988).
82. Section 362(a)(2) provides:
(a) Except as provided ... a petition filed under section 301, 302,
or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,
of -
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of
the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of
the case under this title."
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) (1988).
83. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
84. Id. at 273. Because the remedy protected against "potential future
harm" rather than compensating for "past wrongful acts," the police power
exception applied. Id. The court looked to the harm that the action intended
to address rather than its form. The court also found that the remedy could
not consist of money alone, and therefore it did not consist of an attempt to
enforce a monetary judgment. Id. at 275.
85. McBain, supra note 58, at 246. But see supra note 32 discussing the
likelihood of debtors surviving Chapter 11.
Another bankruptcy issue in conflict with existing environmental law is
''adequate protection." Congress included the adequate protection clause to
"insure that the secured creditor receives the value for which he bargained."
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6295. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.
Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bank-
ruptcy, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 97 (1984) [hereinafter Corporate Reorganizations]
(discussing protection of secured creditors in corporate Chapter 11 reorgani-
zations).
Section 362(d) provides that a secured creditor may petition to lift the stay
"for cause, including the lack of adequate protection ... ." 11 U.S.C. §
362(d)(1) (1988). However, the trustee in bankruptcy must bear the burden of
the proof on the lack of adequate protection. 11 U.S.C. § 363(o)(1) (1988).
Bankruptcy Rule 4001 provides the procedures for obtaining adequate
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
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In Ohio v. Kovacs," the Supreme Court held that the auto-
matic stay applies only to the enforcement of monetary envi-
ronmental judgments, but does not apply to suits to enforce the
state's regulatory sfatutes.8 The court further held that Ohio's
environmental injunction against Kovacs was dischargeable in
bankruptcy as a debt converted into a monetary obligation.8
Ohio was assigned a receiver who was performing the cleanup
and only wanted monetary reimbursement from Kovacs to defray
the cleanup costs. 9
However, in In re Chateaugay Corp.,90 the bankruptcy court
refused to lift the automatic stay. The court invoked its equitable
powers under section 10591 of the Bankruptcy Code to enjoin a
citizens' group from initiating a lawsuit to monitor post-petition
cleanup activities and to diminish ongoing violations of the
Clean Water Act at a mining site in Minnesota.92 The court held
protection. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001. Methods of adequate protection include
periodic cash payments, additional or replacement liens, or the "indubitable
equivalent." 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1988). In re Environmental Waste Control,
Inc., 125 B.R. 546 (N.D. Ind. 1991), is an example of a case in which the
court relaxed the enforcement of the adequate protection provisions in favor
of environmental cleanup. The district court ordered a debtor to use estate
property for environmental cleanup. Id. at 546-47. A secured creditor objected
on the basis of adequate protection. Id. at 552. The court held that "[the
secured creditor's] position regarding its priority over the estate's assets must
yield in light of the competing environmental harms." Id.
86. 469 U.S. 274 (1985). The State of Ohio obtained an injunction ordering
Kovacs, on behalf of Chem-Dyne Co. and in his individual capacity as its
CEO, to clean up certain industrial and hazardous waste disposal sites and to
pay $75,000 to the state for injury to wildlife and other violations. Id. at 275-
76. Kovacs failed to comply with the injunction and the state appointed a
receiver to take possession of all of Kovacs' property and other assets in order
to begin cleanup of the sites. Kovacs filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy before
the cleanup was completed. Id.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the dischargeability of
Kovacs' obligation under the injunction and affirmed the holding of the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals against the state. Id. at 285.
87. Id. at 284-85.
88. 469 U.S. at 283.
89. Id. at 276, 282.
90. 118 B.R. 19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
91. Section 105(a) provides:
(a) The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.
No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by
a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from,
sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination nec-
essary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or
rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
92. 118 B.R. at 23.
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that such proposed litigation would be an unnecessary expense
of the debtor's estate since the State of Minnesota and the
debtor were cooperating to effectuate cleanup. 93
The trend favoring environmental cleanup indicates that the
EPA's Superfund claims will survive the automatic stay provi-
sions of the Code.94 Private party claims and actions generally
are stayed under the Code because the police power exception
to the automatic stay does not apply.95
93. Id. The legislative history of § 362(a)(1) suggests that environmental
litigation falls within the exception for governmental actions (i.e., the police
power exception), but only as to non-monetary judgments. This restrictive
application of the exception to non-monetary judgments would only avoid
giving the governmental unit preferential treatment concerning money judg-
ments to the detriment of all other creditors. Therefore, claims brought by
the government for reimbursement of environmental response costs should not
be exempt from the automatic stay unless the governmental unit is suing a
debtor for future costs of "environmental protection." S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5838.
94. Phelan, supra note 33, at 636. The majority of courts do not apply
the automatic stay to environmental claims based on two different lines of
reasoning. One line of reasoning suggests that the EPA's efforts to recover
response costs are pecuniary in nature and therefore cannot be collected in
bankruptcy. See United States v. Nicolet, 857 F.2d 202, 210 (3d Cir. 1988)
(holding that the automatic stay does not preclude claims due to the police
power exception that allows for recovery of CERCLA response costs); In re
Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291, 297 (6th Cir. 1988) (precluding application
of automatic stay to claims under the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act
that were within the police power exception to the automatic stay).
Other courts have reasoned that the Superfund was enacted "to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of the public," rather than for financial or
pecuniary reasons, and therefore the automatic stay does not apply. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mattiace, Inc., 73 B.R. 816, 819 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (citations
omitted).
A minority of courts apply the automatic stay to environmental claims, as
well as to all other claims in bankruptcy. See United States v. Standard Metals
Corp., 49 B.R. 623, 625 (D. Colo. 1985) (requiring United States to collect
fine payable under the Clean Water Act in bankruptcy court); Thomas Solvent
Co. v. Kelley (In re Thomas Solvent Co.), 44 B.R. 83, 88 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1984) (applying automatic stay to order requiring site owner to remediate
contaminated ground water if site owner converted case to Chapter 7 liqui-
dation); United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20,310, 20,311 (D.N.H. 1982) (applying the automatic stay because
the order required "the expenditure of substantial funds," which is the
equivalent of a money judgment and therefore prohibited).
95. Abandonment is another bankruptcy issue which conflicts with CER-
CLA. Section 554(a) of CERCLA concerns abandoned property of the bank-
ruptcy estate, not abandonment of liabilities including those levied by CERCLA.
See generally DOUGLAS BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 591 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter CASES, PROBLEMS,
AND MATERIALS]. Consequently, abandonment of property will not relieve the




Corporations, to avoid reimbursing the EPA for response
costs resulting from CERCLA liability, allege that successor
U.S.C. § 9607 (1988). Environmental laws require parties to maintain property
and take security measures such as fencing and securing barrels. Trustees often
abandon property to avoid such costly measures and escape liability. See
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERItS, supra, at 592. One commentator "wonders
by what rationale property that cannot be abandoned outside bankruptcy may
be abandoned inside bankruptcy." Losch, supra note 22, at 150.
The Supreme Court addressed the abandonment issue in Midlantic Nat'l
Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986). The
Court held that the trustee's "absolute" power to abandon property of little
value and subject to a state court order of cleanup was subordinate to the
need to protect the public health and welfare. Id. at 501. The Court further
stated:
The Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an
abandonment without formulating conditions that will adequately
protect the public's health and safety .... [A] trustee may not
abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation
that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety
from identified hazards.
Id. at 507 (footnote omitted).
After Midlantic, courts have struggled to determine whether a threat to the
public health and safety is necessary to restrict the trustee's power to abandon
property or whether a mere violation of an environmental law designed to
protect the public from "imminent and identifiable harm" is enough to trigger
restrictions. Midlantic requires a threat to the public health and welfare before
courts will impose limitations on abandonment power. In re FCX, Inc., 96
Bankr. 49, 55 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989).
Full compliance with all environmental laws prior to abandonment is not
always necessary. A minority of courts hold that abandonment is prohibited
unless there is full compliance with environmental laws unless such compliance
is so onerous as to interfere with the adjudication of the bankruptcy process.
See, e.g., In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987)
(applying the minority rule and finding that the depletion of the estate due
to compliance with CERCLA was not onerous under Midlantic).
The Minnesota Bankruptcy Court in In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R.
268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986), enunciated several factors to determine whether
abandonment may be allowed based upon the amount and type of funds
available for cleanup. The factors are: "1) the imminence of danger to the
public health and safety, 2) the extent of probable harm, 3) the amount and
type of hazardous waste, 4) the cost to bring the property into compliance
with environmental laws, and 5) the amount and type of funds available for
cleanup." Id. at 272.
One court went so far as to state that "the trustee cannot be ordered to
comply with a cleanup obligation that he does not have the financial resources
to satisfy." In re Microfab, 105 B.R. 161, 169 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). In
Microfab, the court found that even if the trustees expended all of the estate's
assets on compliance, the cleanup would still be underfunded. Additionally,
there was no assurance that the trustee would thereby "significantly improve
the condition of the Site." The court, therefore, permitted abandonment. Id.
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liability does not exist under CERCLA.9 However, in Louisiana-
Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc. , 97 the Ninth Circuit held that,
although Congress failed to address specifically the issue of
corporate successor liability in CERCLA, Congress intended for
successor liability to apply.98 Whether the successor corporation
is liable for all of the environmental liabilities of the predecessor
corporations depends upon the manner in which such corpora-
tions were acquired. 99 Likewise, the issue of whether property
laden with environmental liabilities must be transferred with
such liabilities depends upon the interpretation of CERCLA.1°°
In United States v. Distler,01 the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky also addressed the issue
of corporate successor liability under CERCLA section
107(a)(3).' 02 The court applied the doctrine of successor liability,
which extends liability under CERCLA to include successor
corporations that the statute does not cover expressly. 03 The
court imposed such liability to further CERCLA's remedial
purpose. The traditional doctrine of successor liability imposes
liability assuming the corporation and its shareholders are sep-
arate beings, and therefore, when corporate stock changes hands,
the corporation's obligations are not affected.104
96. See, e.g., Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 793,
795-96 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
97. 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
98. Id. at 1263. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.,
851 F.2d 86, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1988). See also In re Acushmet River & New
Bedford Harbor Proceedings Re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010,
1013 (D. Mass. 1989). But see Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 734 F.
Supp. 793, 795-96 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that successor liability does not
exist under CERCLA).
99. Susan M. Girard, Casenote, An Expansion of Corporate Successor
Liability Under CERCLA: United States v. Distler, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 205,
216-17 (1992).
100. Id. at 220-21.
101. 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
102. This case is one of first impression as to the application of the doctrine
of successor liability pursuant to CERCLA. Id. at 640.
103. Id. at 643. The traditional doctrine of successor liability imposes
liability on the purchaser of assets only to the extent of liabilities expressly
assumed by the purchaser. Id. at 642-43. Distler expanded the application of
this "mere continuation" exception by eliminating the continuity of share-
holder interest requirement. Andrew S. Hogeland & Mary Griffin, Environ-
mental Liabilities of Successor and Parent Corporations Under CERCLA, 35
BOSTON Bus. J. 6 (1991).
104. Girard, supra note 99, at 207.
A corporation can transfer ownership in four ways: 1) a sale of its stock;
2) a sale of its assets; 3) a merger; or 4) a consolidation. See generally 19
AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2503 (1986). Generally, when a sale of stock, a
merger, or a consolidation occurs, the liabilities of the previous ownership arehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
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Some courts have adopted a version of the "mere continua-
tion" exception, referred to as the "continuity of business
enterprise" exception or "substantial continuity" exception. 10 5
Courts have employed the following factors to determine whether
such an exception applies: (1) whether the successor retains the
same employees, the same supervisory personnel, and the same
production facilities; (2) whether it produces the same products;
(3) whether it retains the same name; (4) whether it maintains
continuity of assets and general business operations; and (5)
whether the successor corporation holds itself out to the public
as a continuation of the previous corporation. 106 Although the
status of successor liability under CERCLA is unclear, it appears
that most courts uphold such liability to further Congress'
objective to make the responsible parties pay for their environ-
mental misdeeds.
The EPA's current approaches, including the equity stake
approach, for obtaining response cost reimbursement do not
solve the conflict between the Code and CERCLA. The EPA
currently must conduct extensive negotiation with the debtor(s), 107
but this is of little aid to the EPA as a solution in bankruptcy.
Therefore, a proposal is needed that will resolve the conflict
between the two statutes. Creating a non-lien "superpriority"
status to be applied both inside and outside of bankruptcy will
result in just such a resolution.
not retained by the new corporate entity. 15 WiLLL m M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7122-7123 (perm. ed.
rev. vol. 1990).
Common law provides that the scope of successor corporation liability is
dependent upon the type of transaction used by the corporation and its
successor. Id. § 7122. For example, when a corporation buys the assets of
another it is liable only to the extent of the liabilities expressly assumed in
the acquisition agreement. Id. There are several exceptions, including (1) when
there has been an express or implied assumption of liability by the purchasing
corporation; (2) when the transaction amounts to an actual or de facto merger;(3) when there is evidence that the transfer was fraudulent or lacking in good
faith; or (4) when the transferee corporation is a mere continuation of the
transferor. Id.
105. See, e.g., Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir.
1985) (enumerating factors to consider when applying the continuous business
enterprise exception); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 (lst
Cir. 1974) (finding successor corporation liable because it was "carrying on
with the manufacture and servicing of the same line of equipment").
106. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260, 1265 n.7 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing factors enumerated in Mozingo, 752 F.2d at 175).
107. Moses, supra note 24, at B7 (quoting Martin Baker, an environmental
attorney at Stroock & Stroock & Laven in New York); see also supra note 38
and accompanying text for a discussion of substantial delay in reorganization
due to failing negotiations.
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IV. WHY CERCLA's- CURRENT REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURE
Is INADEQUATE
CERCLA and SARA authorize the EPA to obtain reimburse-
ment for costs expended from the Superfund, but they do not
give the EPA an enhanced status claim. 08 Therefore, the EPA
often is treated like any other unsecured creditor.' °9 The EPA
is not the same as an ordinary unsecured creditor because it
neither solicited the debtor nor bargained to extend credit.
Consequently, the Code should not treat the EPA as an unse-
cured creditor that bargained for the inherent risk of collec-
tion." 0
Commentators previously have suggested that the Bankruptcy
Code should be amended to provide the EPA with a special
priority claim in bankruptcy."' However, this approach has
several problems. First, the EPA's actions against companies
that liquidate rather than file for bankruptcy would not be
helped by the priority." 2 While many of the EPA's claims are
against debtors in bankruptcy,"' the majority of its claims are
108. Some claims are given administrative priority, such as CERCLA § 106
claims. However, most claims are treated as unsecured claims. See supra notes
60-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the priority of CERCLA
claims.
109. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
courts' treatment of this issue.
110. In Chateaugay Corp., the PBGC contended that it should be treated
as the equivalent of a federal taxing authority and receive a seventh priority
position in bankruptcy. 115 B.R at 778. The court rejected this position
because the automatic stay prevented PBGC's claims from ripening into liens,
and therefore the corporation's claims did not have the status of tax claims
(7th priority) under § 507(a)(7)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. The court found
that the underlying claim at issue should not automatically receive tax priority
status simply because the PBGC is authorized to create a lien similar to a
federal tax lien. Chateaugay, 115 B.R. at 779. In addition, ERISA claims are
not included in the detailed list of § 507(e)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code, nor
is there any indication in the legislative history of § 507 that Congress intended
to grant PBGC liens seventh priority. Id. The Supreme Court agreed in
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990), and held
that the PBGC should be treated like an unsecured creditor.
111. McBain, supra note 58, at 234. Commentators have advocated the
same approach for the PBGC. See, e.g., David Levin, Pension Corporation
Once Again Confronts Serious Fiscal Woes, LEGAL TIMEs, July 27, 1987, at
32 (advocating that Congress create a bankruptcy priority for the PBGC); see
also Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991
Wis. L. REv. 65, 92 n.154 (listing commentators who recommend amendment
of the Bankruptcy Code to create a priority for PBGC).
112. Keating, supra note 111, at 92.
113. See supra note 23 and accompanying text noting an estimate that
almost one-third of all environmental claims will be against corporations in
bankruptcy.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
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against corporations outside of bankruptcy. Therefore, an ap-
proach that provides a priority to the EPA exclusively in bank-
ruptcy is not adequate.
Additionally, such an amendment would result in conflict
between the EPA and private creditors. The EPA would en-
courage debtors to file bankruptcy to ensure that it would receive
a priority status. Conversely, the independent creditors would
attempt to deter such a filing even when a Chapter 11 reorgan-
ization would be the most effective means of distributing as-
sets." 4 The problem with bankruptcy avoidance is that state
debtor-creditor law is a "race" to the courthouse." 5 Because
each creditor is self-centered, it is unlikely that a reorganization
will occur outside of bankruptcy" 6 - even if it would mean
better results for the creditors as a group." 7
Chapter 11 reorganizations ensure that a corporation's assets
are put to their best use." 8 Unlike creditor arrangements outside
of bankruptcy, Chapter 11 prevents single creditors from refus-
ing to participate and thereby preventing the corporation from
reorganizing.' 9 In addition, the automatic stay' 20 prevents piece-
meal liquidation after the debtor files the petition.12'
In response to the conflicting purposes of CERCLA and the
Code, the Chateaugay court stated that:
If the Code, fairly construed, creates limits on the
extent of environmental cleanup efforts, the remedy
114. Keating, supra note 111, at 94.
115. Id. at 93.
116. A nonbankruptcy "workout" is based upon each party's perception
of its position in a Chapter 11 reorganization, and consequently, a Chapter 7
liquidation. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 19, at 434. See also supra
note 32 and accompanying text.
117. Keating, supra note III, at 93.
118. Filing for bankruptcy creates an estate containing, with limited excep-
tions, "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
119. A creditor may elect not to file a claim in the bankruptcy, 11
U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988) (creditor "may" file proof of claim), but
only "claimants" are entitled to distribution from the estate in a
chapter 7 case or from the post-confirmation debtor in a confirmed
chapter 11 reorganization.
Keating, supra note 1ll, at 94 n.158 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 726, 1141 (1988)).
Debtors are considered to have "prepackaged" Chapter 11 cases when they
have already negotiated an acceptable agreement with their creditors before
the petition is filed, but need the help of the bankruptcy law to overcome
one or more intolerant creditors. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 19, at
435. Intolerant creditors, who ordinarily present insurmountable obstacles
outside of Chapter 11, can be outvoted by the accepting creditors in the same
class and thereby coerced into accepting the plan. Id.
120. See supra notes 71-93 and accompanying text.
121. See BAIRD, supra note 19, at 195.
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is for Congress to make exceptions to the Code to
achieve other objectives that Congress chooses to reach,
rather than for courts to restrict the meaning of across-
the-board legislation like a bankruptcy law in order
to promote objectives evident in more focused sta-
tutes.122
The Chateaugay court is absolutely right. Congress must remedy
the conflict between CERCLA and the Code to achieve an
objective favorable to the EPA.
A. Proposal: An EPA Superpriority Status
This Note proposes that Congress mandate that corporations
with CERCLA liabilities shall not transfer any assets until the
EPA's reimbursement claim is completely satisfied.'2 Under such
a statute, the EPA would be given the authority to enjoin a
corporation from transferring its assets until the agency's re-
imbursement claim was satisfied in full. Consequently, private
creditors of the company would be prevented from levying and
selling assets of the corporation to satisfy their debts until the
EPA received payment for its reimbursement claim.
The statute should be subject to two limitations. First, the
statute would only apply prospectively. 24 This would protect the
interests of the current secured creditors.1'2 Second, the EPA's
superpriority status would be subordinate to any purchase-money
security interest. 2 6 Purchase-money security interests allow the
use of money in return for a security interest in the purchased
property. 127 Without security in the purchased collateral, the
debtor would not be able to obtain the loan.
The commerce clause authorizes Congress to create a statute
that would preempt state-law property rights.2 8 In fact, this
would not be the first time that Congress has used the commerce
clause to grant a superpriority position to a specific creditor
class. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)129 entitles workers
of a company to a first-priority lien for the amount of any
122. In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991).
123. Cf. Keating, supra note 111, at 100 (proposing that the reimbursement
claim of the PBGC be satisfied fully before a company with a terminated




127. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1977).
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
129. 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1988) (stating that Congress' authority to enact
the FLSA derived from "its power to regulate commerce among the several
States and with foreign nations").https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
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unpaid federal minimum wage. If workers are not paid, the
Secretary of Labor may request a court to enjoin the sale of
the firm's goods until the unpaid workers are paid at least the
minimum wage for the work performed. 30
The superpriority statute also would state specifically that the
EPA's superlien is superior to secured creditors.13' Finally, the
statute would govern in bankruptcy proceedings as well as
outside bankruptcy. 32 Although Congress did not mandate such
provisions in the FLSA, courts have interpreted the statute to
allow priority over secured creditors, and to apply in bank-
ruptcy. 33
B. Advantages of the Proposal
The primary advantage of the proposal is that CERCLA's
objectives - to protect the public health and welfare and the
environment134 - are at least as significant as the objective that
Congress used to enact the FLSA superpriority status. One of
FLSA's purposes is to ensure that workers receive the federal
minimum wage. 35 CERCLA's objective is much more expansive
because it protects the public's health and welfare. 36 CERCLA's
important objective deserves to receive a superpriority status to
ensure that the Superfund will continue to protect the public.
Second, a superpriority statute would prevent corporations
from entering bankruptcy unnecessarily because they would no
longer have an advantage over those corporations outside of
bankruptcy. 3 7 The statute would also further reduce the "moral
hazard'1 3 of corporations that do not take the necessary pre-
130. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(1), 207(a)(1), 215(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
131. Keating, supra note 111, at 104.
132. Id.
133. In Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27 (1987), the
Supreme Court prohibited secured creditors from selling their collateral until
the company complied with the FLSA.
134. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
135. 29 U.S.C. § 206(b) (1988).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(I) (1988).
137. See supra notes 33-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
current advantages of bankruptcy and the Code's conflict with CERCLA.
138. The term "moral hazard" has been used by commentators to describe
the situation in which the federal government "insures" parties, such as the
FSLIC and the PBGC, against certain risks, such as underfunded banking
reserves and pension plans, so that the parties have a decreased incentive to
take precautionary measures to avoid the risks of underfunding such plans.
See generally James R. Barth et al., Moral Hazard and the Thrift Crisis: An
Empirical Analysis, 44 CoNsUME FiN. L.Q. REP. 22 (1990); Donald R. Deere,
Note, On the Potential for Private Insurers to Reduce the Inefficiencies of
Moral Hazard, 9 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 219 (1989); Richard S. Higgins,
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cautions to prevent the release or potential release of hazardous
waste into the environment. Although hazardous waste will
continue to exist, corporations will be more prudent in their
disposal because the statute will prevent them from discharging
the majority of their liability in bankruptcy. 13 9
Third, private creditors will have more incentive to examine
the existing CERCLA liabilities, as well as potential environ-
mental liabilities of corporations, and therefore price their goods
and services accordingly. 14 Banks and lending organizations will
use their knowledge about the particular industries in which they
are involved to determine the terms of their loan agreements.' 4'
Trade creditors similarly will use information acquired through
repeated dealings with customer corporations concerning the
different industries, corporations, and the financial status of
corporations .142 Consequently, creditors are likely to be aware
of environmental liabilities. For example, financially unstable
corporations involved in risk-bearing industries 43 are likely to
have numerous liabilities, including those CERCLA imposes.
Creditors would be aware that their claims were subordinate to
CERCLA and would insist that the corporation reimburse the
EPA for their CERCLA liabilities before they would extend
credit for goods or services. Such creditor demands would be
equivalent to the private creditors monitoring the industry to
ensure that the EPA is reimbursed for CERCLA liabilities. 44
C. Potential Criticism of the Proposal
This proposal may result in criticism concerning whether
private creditors would assume the risk of being subordinated
Products Liability Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Contributory Negligence, 10
J. LEGAL SWtn. 111 (1981); Keating, supra note 111, at 67-68.
The concept of "moral hazard" can also be applied to CERCLA. PRPs
may be less efficient in their disposal of hazardous waste when they know
that other PRPs exist and will have to contribute to the cleanup if and when
such time occurs. Likewise, corporations and the public at large rely on the
EPA, CERCLA, and the Superfund to authorize, fund, and perform environ-
mental cleanup. Without such an "insurance agency" to fall back on, one
wonders if PRPs would be more cautious in their handling, storage, and
disposal of hazardous wastes.
139. See supra notes 20-23, 33-93 and accompanying text discussing the
refuge that debtors currently find in bankruptcy.
140. Keating, supra note 111, at 102.
141. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and
the Corporation, 52 U. Ci. L. Rv. 89, 100 (1985).
142. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing
and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1160-61 (1979).
143. Risk-bearing industries include chemical and industrial corporations.
Barr, supra note 2, at 923.
144. Keating, supra note 11, at 104 (discussing the subordination of secured
creditors to the state's cost of cleanup under superlien statutes).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
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to the EPA's reimbursement claim. Unsecured creditors are
already subordinated to most claims, including secured claims,
administrative expenses, and priority claims such as federal tax
claims. Therefore, they have already accepted the risk of ex-
tending credit to corporations with the knowledge that their
claims are subordinate to a vast number of others.1 45
Moreover, there are existing legal doctrines similar to this
proposed solution that have not eliminated private creditors
from extending credit to corporations. One significant example
is the state "superlien" statute.' 46 Six states currently have
superlien statutes that subordinate even fully-perfected secured
creditors to the state's expenses of hazardous waste cleanup. 47
Also, case law holds secured lenders fully responsible for the
environmental cleanup of land on which it has a security in-
terest. 48 Thus, trade creditors and lending institutions still will
be willing to extend credit to corporations, while the inherent
CERCLA risks will simply be reflected in the cost of the goods
and services provided.
CONCLUSION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Bankruptcy Code currently
are unclear as to the existence of CERCLA claims and their
priority status in bankruptcy. Many corporations take advantage
of this disparity and declare bankruptcy in an effort to escape
CERCLA liability. The EPA's recent approach of acquiring an
equity stake in a successor corporation does not solve the existing
problem. Congress must enact a statute that gives CERCLA
claims a superpriority status both inside and outside of bank-
ruptcy. By doing so, corporations will no longer seek protection
145. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
priority of claims in bankruptcy, in particular the courts' position as to the
current priority of CERCLA claims in bankruptcy.
146. The discussion of state superlien statutes is beyond the scope of this
Note. See generally Ballantine, supra note 34 (discussing state superlien sta-
tutes).
147. Donald W. Stever, ECRA and Other Restrictions on the Transfer of
Hazardous Waste Sites, in TiH IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ON
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 163, 168-69 (PLI Real Estate Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series 1988).
148. See generally Roslyn Tom, Note, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender
Management Participation Under Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE
L.J. 925, 929 (1989) (stating that a court interpreting CERCLA held secured
creditors liable for cleanup costs if they participated excessively in the man-
agement of the contaminated site in which they had a security interest).
The discussion of secured lenders' liability is beyond the scope of this Note.
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from such claims in bankruptcy, and the EPA will be reimbursed
for the funds expended from the Superfund.
Susan J. Zook*
* J.D. 1994, Washington University.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/13
